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Abstract 
This brief Foreword evaluates the innovative new theory of law, religion, and 
state by Catholic jurist, Rafael Domingo, and shows some of its antecedents in the 
natural law theory of Dutch Protestant jurist, Hugo Grotius.  
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Foreword 
In his monumental tome, On the Law of War and Peace (1625), Dutch 
Protestant jurist Hugo Grotius ventured the (in)famous “hypothesis” that the law of 
nature would exist “even if we should concede that which cannot be conceded 
without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of 
no concern to him.”  For Grotius, this was not a declaration of impiety, but a call for 
respect and reverence for God even in the midst of the bitter religious wars that were 
tearing his Christian world apart.  For Grotius it was impious for any one state to 
pretend that it had fully captured divine truth in its law, and to kill and persecute 
others for taking contrary religious views.  God’s truth is above the law and politics of 
any human community, he insisted, and wars of religion are an insult to God.  It was 
likewise impious for any antagonist, even in the midst of a just war, to defy the 
natural “law written on the heart” that guided them on the paths of virtue.  The law of 
nature teaches not only war but also peace, not only retribution but also 
reconciliation.  Regardless of what any state law and policy might require, the natural 
law sets limits on human behavior even in wars between the bitterest enemies. 
In this short and provocative treatise, Spanish Catholic jurist, Rafael Domingo 
articulates a comparable need to bracket God from the positive law of any state – 
again out of respect for God and God’s law, in all the different ways that God is 
understood today.  For Domingo, respect for God requires a state and community to 
recognize an antecedent or transcendent source of law and rights that lies beyond 
the positive laws of the state.  A state may acknowledge God in ceremonies, 
symbols, and political iconography that accord with local beliefs.  It may 
acknowledge that rights and duties, and moral principles and practices of life are 
rooted in “the law of nature and nature’s God.”  But beyond that, the state cannot 
and should not go.  God is a “metalegal concept,” Professor Domingo insists, who is 
above the formulations of any state or any political legal order.  The state has 
enormous power and responsibility in secular matters, but it has no jurisdiction, no 
power to “declare the law” (jus dicere) for the religious sphere.  Religion is left to the 
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conscience of each individual and to the confessions of peaceable religious 
communities.   
In our multi-religious world, the law of the modern state must be secular, 
Professor Domingo insists.  This means that states should end traditional forms of 
religious establishment – whether Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Confucian, or 
otherwise.  The state has no business dictating, defining, or favoring any particular 
religious doctrine, liturgy, text, or canon.  It has no business involving itself in the 
polity, property, or personnel of any religious body.  It has no business coercing its 
subjects to practice or fund religion, or discriminating in favor of one religion and 
against another.  For the state to reduce God and religion to a simple political 
category or a legal command is ultimately a form of political idolatry, even 
blasphemy.  For the state to dictate to private consciences or to religious authorities 
how they should be or act religiously is ultimately an invasion of the sovereignty of 
God.  Traditional religious approaches to law and politics, while they may have been 
popular in the second millennium, cannot be sustained.  
Modern secularist approaches to religion are equally problematic, however, 
Professor Domingo insists.  The modern state must not establish a secularist 
ideology -- whether liberalism, socialism, communism, or fascism – that stands in the 
place of a traditional religion and commands comparable devotion and allegiance in 
violation of the conscience of the individual, the authority of religious communities, 
and the ultimate sovereignty of God.  Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, Nazi Germany, 
Mussolini’s Italy, Pinochet’s Chile, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, are only a few of the many 
examples of modern totalitarian states that have arrogated to themselves this kind of 
transcendent power.   
But less obvious versions of this kind of state excess are also at hand in 
current aggressive policies of laïcité in modern-day France and elsewhere in Europe 
or policies of secularization in modern-day America and Canada.  These state 
policies, too, ultimately fail to respect God, religion, and conscience.  They 
sometimes catechize versions of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” that can run 
roughshod over religious ideas of responsibility, difference, and community.  They 
sometimes teach nationalism, patriotism, and cultural allegiance that make idols of a 
state, people, and ways of life.  They sometimes protect, promote, and prescribe 
fundamental ideas about sex, marriage, and family life that upend millennia-long 
patterns of sexual morality taught by religious communities.  But more troubling, still, 
is that these secularists often adopt policies that treat religion as just too dangerous, 
divisive, and diverse in its demands to be accorded any kind of special protection or 
accommodation.  Freedom of conscience claims, the argument goes, unfairly 
demand the right to be a law unto oneself, to the detriment of general laws and to the 
endangerment of other people’s fundamental rights and legitimate interests.  
Institutional religious autonomy is too often just a special cover for abuses of power 
and forms of prejudice that should not be countenanced in any organization – 
religious or not.  Religion should be viewed as just another category of liberty or 
association, with no more preference or privilege than its secular counterparts.  
Religion should be treated as just another form of expression that must play by the 
rules of rational democratic deliberation just like everyone else.   
3 
 
Professor Domingo works hard in this book to counter these new “secularist 
approaches,” to law and politics as much as the old “religious approaches.”  He 
promotes what he calls “a secular theistic approach” that separates religion and 
state, that accommodates all sincere claims of conscience, and that defers to the 
inner workings of peaceable religious organizations that remain true to their callings.  
His approach calls each community to respect God, but not to make God an object 
or end of state power.  It calls each community to respect the autonomy of 
peaceable religious communities, but does not give any religious community the 
secular power to coerce its subjects or to control the state.  It calls political and 
religious communities alike to accommodate the conscience of each individual, but 
to avoid collapsing claims of conscience into simple claims of personal preference.  
And this approach calls all communities to recognize that fundamental questions of 
morality – of war and peace, life and death, marriage and family, nature and 
bioethics, and the like – must draw on states, religions, and private consciences 
together for reflection and resolution, and stop pretending that these questions can 
be treated only dogmatically, only pragmatically, or only with value-neutrality.   
This argument depends on a complex differentiation of different spheres of life 
and power.  It presupposes the ability of secular reason and secular law to operate 
with religion as a friendly ally, but neither as object or enemy.  It presupposes the 
ability of religion to cooperate with the state, but to remain confined to its own 
principal sphere and respect the conscientious claims even of its own members.  
And it presupposes distinctions between religion and law, religion and morality, 
conscience and belief, secularity and secularism, the spiritual and temporal orders, 
and more – all of which boundaries have been and are fiercely contested. 
These are all delicate balances to strike, but Professor Domingo brings great 
learning to the task, drawing on politics, history, jurisprudence, political theory, 
comparative law, European human rights law, and American constitutional law to 
drive home his points.  He puts sundry great scholars in the dock for close 
examination – Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, 
Michael McConnell, Joseph Raz, Kent Greenawalt, Michael Perry, and scores of 
others, including Popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI – in an attempt to work out 
and defend his position.  What emerges in these pages is a lithe, learned, and lively 
engagement with some of the most fundamental questions of law, religion, and the 
state that are challenging persons and peoples throughout the world.   
Professor Domingo would be the first to insist that he is no modern-day 
Grotius, and that this slender volume is no substitute for the massive three-volume 
masterwork, On the Law of War and Peace.  But the efforts of Grotius and Domingo 
still bear comparison.  Both are serious Christians, ultimately interested in preserving 
and protecting what Grotius called The Truth of the Christian Religion, against 
contrary claims by the state and academy.  Both are experts on classical Roman law 
and see its pre-Christianized form as an ideal type of comprehensive system of 
public, private, penal, and procedural law that avoided both religious and secularist 
approaches to law and religion, conscience and morality.  Both aspire to use the idea 
of a “secular legal system” to build both world peace and what Domingo in his last 
Cambridge University Press title called The New Global Law.   
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It has been a pleasure for me to watch this book grow from a small idea first 
discussed over a cup of coffee a few years ago into this short work, which will 
doubtless inspire many more books in the years ahead as these provocative ideas 
are worked out more fully.  Professor Domingo has been a colleague in our Law and 
Religion Center, and was kind enough to share these book ideas in the making with 
our colleagues and students.  Given his Spanish background, Romanist training, and 
Catholic casuistry, he has made novel contributions to our law and religion work, and 
offered unique perspectives to our classes, colloquies, and conversations.  It’s a joy 
to see these literary fruits of his labors, and it’s a privilege to include his work in our 
new Cambridge Law and Christianity series.  
         John Witte, Jr.  
